

Analytic response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine: Balancing military aid to Ukraine and national defence

Mr. Brynjar Arnfinnsson

Agenda


- 1. Introduction
- 2. The security dilemma of donations
- 3. The analytical method
- 4. Concluding remarks



Ukraine is advancing. Slowly.

- Minefields and fortifications.
- No air superiority.
- Relatively few units with modern western equipment.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Pyatykhatky and Robotyne as of October 5, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Note: Russian sources claimed on October 4 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces two kilometers near Verbove. A Russian source claimed on October 3 that Russian forces advanced several hundred meters near Robotyne and Verbove

Western material in the Spring Offensive – 10th Mech. Corps

- 9 brig
- 30.000 pax
- 200 MBT
- 700 IFV





Marder IFV (t) Stryker IFV (w)





Challenger Mk 2 (14) Leopard 2A4/A6 (32) MaxxPRO MRAP (90)





AMX-10RC Mastiff MRAP






M-55 S1 M2 Bradley IFV





Defence industry is not keeping up

- Increasing backlog of orders before the invasion.
- Lean, peacetime production line.
- Who will take the capital risk of scaling up production?



Source: FFI report 22/02210

The security dilemma of donations

How much of our own defence capability should we sacrifice in order to help save Ukraine?

- We need to consider:
 - National security threats
 - How donations affect our ability to handle these threats
 - How donations affects Ukrainian capability



Updated threat description to national security

- Scenario portfolio describing possible threats to Norwegian security.
- Russia cannot fight a conventional two front war.
- The most demanding conventional scenarios are off the table, for now... But for how long?
 - Depends on duration of war.
 - Outcome of war.
 - Rearmament after the war.
- Unconventional and limited threats are still relevant.



Photo: The Danish Armed Forces / NTB

Donations affect national capability


- Donations decrease national capability.
 - Measurable with established method.
- But strengthening Ukraine also strengthens national security.
 - Tricky/impossible to measure.
- Risk of losing specialized military skills.



Photo: www.president.gov.ua


Modelling the consequence for Norwegian capability

- Capability change: Relative change in the Norwegian Armed Forces ability to handle scenario(s).
- The capability change due to each possible donation are weighed with a weight function.
- Different weight function for each scenario.




Modelling the consequence for Ukrainian capability

- Capability change: Scoring according to "Ukrainian wish-list".
- The capability change due to each possible donation are weighed against a threat level.
- The threat level is high now, and uncertain in the future.
 - High immediate needs leads to high discount rate.
- For now only one scenario: Continued full scale conventional war.




The mathematics:

- Utility for Norwegian security:
 - $\sum_{i=1}^{m} \theta_{Ni} \int_{0}^{\infty} \varepsilon_{Ni}(t) \tau_{Ni}(t) dt$
 - Where
 - *m* is the number of scenarios
 - θ_{Ni} is the consequence of scenario i
 - $\varepsilon_{Ni}(t)$ is the change in the Armed Forces' ability to handle scenario i
 - $au_{Ni}(t)$ is the weight function in Norway for scenario i
- Utility in Ukraine:
 - (Only one scenario is considered continued war)
 - $-\theta_U\int_0^\infty \varepsilon_U(t)\tau_U(t)dt$
 - Where
 - θ_U is the consequence of continued war
 - $\varepsilon_U(t)$ is the change in Ukrainian capability
 - $\tau_U(t)$ is the weight function in Ukraine



Examples:


(only one Norwegian scenario)



6-12 mnd

1-3 år

3+ år



6-12 mnd

1-3 years

3+ years

0-3 months

3-6 months

Results:

NASAMS:

Total results:

Art.m:

F-16:

NASAMS:

-9

-40

71

96

149

Art.m:

F-16:

0-3 mnd

3-6 mnd

Methodological challenges and strong points

- Considering different numbers of platforms for donations:
 - Non-linear effects.
- Comparing different platforms is tricky.
- Subjective weights.



- Problem structuring.
- Forces assessments.
- Balancing different defence needs.
- Easy to find good candidates for donation.
- Overcoming organizational bias.

Possible ways forward (analytically)

- Fine-tuning weights.
- Developing scenarios for Ukraine.
- Long-term donation planning.




Photo: Tim Barrick

Concluding remarks: Not losing sight of the big picture...

- Russia cannot handle a two front conventional war.
- Strengthening Ukraine strengthens all sovereign nations.
- The current level of donations is not sufficient for a "quick win".
 - Will the F-16's change the course of the war?
- Industry capacity bottleneck.




Chart: Ukrainian Support Tracker, 13th release

Questions?



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